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we must dig into it if we are to make progress in
understanding the key disputes over whether we
really are, or are not, living in a “new” economy.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments—especially Dick Anderson, who is a co-




To begin our discussion, let me pose this
question: What do we mean by “productivity?”
The most commonly discussed measure is labor
productivity. Labor productivity is simply the
output of either an industry or the aggregate econ-
omy divided by labor input. A change in labor
productivity reflects any change in output that
cannot be accounted for by a change in labor
input; such changes may be due, for example, to
changes in the amount of capital used per person
employed.
I start with this definitional point because
most popular discussions of productivity launch
right into the analysis of the glorious new economy
without noting how important the definition is to
the analysis. It takes only half a second of thought
to understand that it really matters whether a
ditch digger’s higher productivity comes from
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hat in the world has happened in
the United States to raise economic
growth so substantially during the
last few years? Real output has
risen beyond virtually all forecasts; unemploy-
ment has fallen to levels that only a few years
ago were thought to be unattainable; labor pro-
ductivity growth has increased to rates last expe-
rienced many years ago, during the “Golden Age”
of 1950-73; and inflation has remained low and
even fallen slightly. This unlikely coincidence of
economic outcomes has led some observers to
conclude that the economy has entered a “New
Age.” In this age, technical progress in infor-
mation and communication technology—often
referred as “ICT” for short— has, some believe,
removed all previous speed limits on the economy.
From this time forward, potential real output will
grow more rapidly than in the past, and the
unemployment rate will be forever lower. And,
even more remarkably, these events will occur
without any expansionary monetary policy that
might raise fears of higher inflation.
Perhaps I’ve offered an overblown picture of
the story some tell, but my characterization is not
overblown by much. My goal tonight is to bring
some perspective to these events by asking how
unusual they are within both U.S. history and
relative to the experience of other countries during
the 1990s. I’ll concentrate on the productivity part
of the story, for that part has certainly captured
everyone’s attention. I will distinguish carefully
between labor productivity and total factor pro-
ductivity. This issue may sound technical, butsubstituting a backhoe for a shovel or for some
other reason.
Let’s start with a few numbers. Labor produc-
tivity growth in the United States has risen during
the last several years. Using annual average data,
in 1999 labor productivity— output per hour of
labor input—increased 3.0 percent in the nonfarm
business sector. During 1998, the increase was
2.8 percent; during 1997, 2.0 percent. The growth
of labor productivity is not only higher than it
used to be, but for each of the three most recent
years it has been higher than the previous year.
How unusual is this higher rate of labor pro-
ductivity growth? The available U.S. historical
data, beginning in 1929, show that labor produc-
tivity growth is highly volatile. Increases of this
size in the annual growth rate for a year or two
are not unusual in this record, especially during
the early years of business cycle recoveries. But,
such increases are highly unusual during the later
years of an economic expansion. The most recent
Economic Report of the President, for example,
notes that labor productivity in the nonfarm busi-
ness sector increased by only 1.3 percent and 1.1
percent per year, respectively, during the final two
years of the expansions that ended in late 1969
and 1990.
Longer-run comparisons also suggest that
something unusual has occurred. During 1950-73,
for example—the so-called “Golden Age” of U.S.
productivity growth—labor productivity in the
nonfarm business sector increased at a compound
average annual rate of approximately 3 percent.
From 1973 through 1995, productivity growth
slowed to about a 1 percent pace. During the last
two years, labor productivity growth has returned
to its Golden Age rate. The questions of the day
are: Why did labor productivity growth rise?
Will the higher rate continue?
One hypothesis is that the resurgence of labor
productivity growth is closely connected to the
strong pace of business equipment investment
during the 1990s, both in the United States and
Europe. Angus Maddison, the well-known eco-
nomic growth historian, has demonstrated strong
longer-run correlations among three variables in
an economy: the pace of technological innovation,
the rate of investment in new physical capital, and
the growth rate of labor productivity. He stresses
that technological innovations typically are put
into service “embodied” in new capital equip-
ment. In contrast, new ways of doing things that
enhance the productivity of the existing capital
stock rarely have large effects. Strong investment
spending before 1973, both in the United States
and worldwide, contributed to rapid productivity
growth by disseminating new technology. World-
wide investment spending slowed sharply after
1973, and with it worldwide labor productivity
growth. The rebound of business investment
during the 1990s, both in the United States and
Europe, came at a time of major technical progress
(and price decreases) in the production of semi-
conductors and computers. This investment
rebound has undoubtedly contributed to the
recent increase of labor productivity growth.
Changes in labor productivity in foreign coun-
tries provide a second yardstick against which to
judge whether the recent growth of U.S. labor
productivity is unusual or not. Let me caution you,
however, that not all measures of labor produc-
tivity are the same. In the United States, the most
commonly discussed measure is the one produced
by the Productivity Section of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. In this measure, the numerator is the
output of the nonfarm business sector and the
denominator is total hours of work by employees
in that sector. In European publications, however,
the most commonly cited measure is the ratio of
aggregate real GDP to the number of employed
persons. Even more confusing, in some publica-
tions, analysts focus on real GDP per capita,
rather than per employed person, as a measure
of productivity.
A Ph.D. in economics is not required to
appreciate that these various measures of labor
productivity will differ when variables such as
the number of annual hours per employee or
the percentage of the working-age population
employed differ across countries. The U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics is one of the few agencies that
seeks to adjust for these differences and provide
consistent cross-country comparisons.
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BLS publishes the comparative statistics only
once each year and includes only manufacturing.
For the United States, from 1990 to 1998, labor
productivity in manufacturing shows a 3.3 per-
cent annual growth rate of output per hour. For
certain countries, the rate is more rapid: 4.6 per-
cent for Sweden, 3.9 percent for France, and 3.8
percent for the Netherlands. For some others it is
slower: 3.2 percent for Germany, 3.0 percent for
Japan and Belgium, 2.2 percent for the United
Kingdom, and 2.0 percent for Canada. On an
annual basis, the data are erratic: manufacturing
productivity growth in the United States, for exam-
ple, rises to 6.1 percent in 1995, slows to 2.1 per-
cent in 1996, and rises again to 4.1 percent in both
1997 and 1998. In some individual years since
1995, growth rates for other countries again exceed
the U.S. rate: 7.2 percent for France and 5.9 per-
cent for Germany in 1997 and 4.3 percent for
Germany in 1998.
In part, cross-country differences reflect differ-
ent stages of the respective business cycles. In
addition, fluctuations in international economic
conditions make comparisons during the 1990s
tenuous. In general, European nations have been
more strongly affected by international economic
crises such as occurred in Mexico in 1995, East
Asia in 1997, and Russia in 1998. On balance,
though, comparisons of U.S. and European pro-
ductivity growth suggest similar patterns.
Additional confirmation of the common
impact of ICT technology is evident in a compari-
son of the analysis in the most recent Economic
Report of the President with similar analysis in
the European Union’s December 1999 Joint
Employment Report. Both reports are concerned
with restructuring, layoffs of workers, and the
need for “lifelong” education to adapt to a chang-
ing world. The EU’s Employment Report also
reviews the large number of initiatives by mem-
ber nations to promote entrepreneurship in the
new “information society,” including easing the
administrative burdens that hamper job creation
by small business.
Finally, I must note that an increasing number
of studies have addressed the role of ICT invest-
ment in the services industries. Such studies are
hampered by the fact that output of these sectors
is less well-measured than that of manufacturing.
The studies generally have reached similar con-
clusions,however:Servicesectorshaveextensively
purchased new ICT equipment and deployed it




To this point, I have concentrated on labor
productivity. The contributions to output of other
inputs, including physical capital, have been
ignored. For some purposes and during some
time periods, these omissions might be unimpor-
tant. Unfortunately, as I hinted in the introduction
of this speech, this is not one of those periods.
The outstanding fact of the past decade is the
sharp fall in the price of ICT relative to the prices
of other productive inputs. To the extent that
these price decreases have induced firms to sub-
stitute ICT-type capital for labor, the story of the
“new economy” is one of input substitution, not
productivity growth. Although ditch diggers may
not have bigger and better backhoes, most workers
have been equipped with better communications
equipment, better computers, and better software.
Recall that changes in labor productivity
reflect all changes in output that cannot be attrib-
uted to changes in labor input. Changes in input
prices that induce substitution by firms of capital
for labor will increase measured labor productiv-
ity. (Of course, if output and sales do not increase
sufficiently, higher productivity will also result
in fewer workers in that firm or industry, as has
been the continuing case in agriculture for 150
years.) These substitutions, however, are not what
economists commonly refer to as “technical
change,” nor are they likely to increase the long-
term trend growth of the economy’s potential
output. Instead, we need to measure the effect of
new technology on output after accounting for all
the growth of input due to increases in both capital
and labor. The concept of total factor productivity
seeks to do so.
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in output relative to an index number that meas-
ures the combined inputs of labor and capital.
Changes in total factor productivity reflect changes
in the organization of production or in technology
that are not due to changes in either labor or
capital inputs.
The concept of total factor productivity is
not new. Economists often refer to TFP as the
“Solow residual,” following from Robert Solow’s
seminal 1956 growth theory article. But, to under-
stand TFP, we must back up one step: What do
we mean by “capital”? In early growth theory
research, such as Solow’s 1956 and 1957 articles
and Edward Denison’s later work on growth
accounting, physical capital was taken to be a
homogenous input. That is, in the analysis, differ-
ent vintages of capital were not separated. Many
analysts have argued that this was (and is) a seri-
ous mistake. New technology is primarily put into
use in the form of new physical capital, and differ-
ing vintages of capital must be adjusted carefully
for their productive capacity. Ironically, Robert
Solow himself argued for this point of view in
three later articles, published between 1960 and
1963.
In recent econometric studies of total factor
productivity, labor and capital inputs have been
measured with index-number methods similar
to those introduced by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis in 1995 to measure real GDP. Such meas-
ures are particularly appropriate when several
types of each input must be included—such as
workers with differing amounts of education or
several different vintages of physical capital—
and the relative prices of the various inputs are
changing. The econometric methods attempt to
separate changes in labor productivity into two
parts: the part due to the increase in the amount
of capital per unit of labor and the part due to
organizational changes permitted by new tech-
nology. The first part measures the increase in out-
put as a consequence of the application of more
capital. The second part is the “Solow residual,”
that part of additional output which is not
accounted for by inputs of labor and capital.
A key finding from this research is that the
outstanding fact in the United States since 1995
has been a 28 percent per year decrease in the
costs of ICT equipment, quality adjusted. These
studies conclude that the overwhelming factor
behind the increase in U.S. labor productivity
during the 1990s has been the increase in the
capital/labor ratio. Although differing in the
details, these studies on balance conclude that
total factor productivity growth has increased
moderately since 1995, and in the past three years
has contributed perhaps 0.75 to 1 percentage point
of the growth of aggregate real GDP.
If confirmed by further research, these results
have important implications for the future. In
particular, the results resurrect a common theme
in the growth theory literature of the last 45 years:
the critical importance of not confusing changes
in levels with changes in rates of growth. Sharp,
unexpected decreases in the price of an important
input—ICTequipment—mayinducealong-lasting,
perhaps permanent, increase in the level of labor
productivity and potential output. But the same
decreases may suggest little or no increase, except
for near-term adjustments, in the growth rate of
either labor productivity or potential output. For
the growth rate itself to be permanently higher, the
rapid decline in the price of ICT equipment and
consequent continuing increase in the capital/
labor ratio would have to be permanent.
In related, widely publicized research, Robert
Gordon has argued that all of the U.S. economy’s
productivity gain during the 1990s is due to
improvements in the production of computers,
or more specifically, in the production of the semi-
conductor components of computers. He argues
that most other segments of the economy have
experienced little, if any, gain from the use of
computers. Although these more recent economet-
ric results suggest somewhat higher total factor
productivity growth than Gordon’s estimates,
they are consistent with Gordon’s findings. In
sectors outside semiconductor manufacturing,
the improvement in computers has induced the
substitution of less expensive for more expensive
inputs; net (econometrically) of the input substi-
tution effect, most of these sectors have gained
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nology has not shifted the production function in
these sectors but has simply led to the application
of more capital per unit of labor to the production
process. Semiconductor manufacturing, on the
other hand, has benefited significantly because
the output of that sector—better computers—is a
very important input to the same sector: new,
more powerful computers are essential to the
design and manufacture of even newer, more
powerful computers. In turn, these computers
will ease the production of even newer machines.
As newer computers continue to enhance our
ability to design and build ever more powerful
machines, the “per unit” cost of computing likely
will continue to decrease. In 1990, the per-unit
decrease in the price of computing power was
running at approximately a 15 percent annual
rate; by the middle of the decade, the price of com-
puting power was falling at nearly a 30 percent
annual rate. As the price continues to decrease,
it seems likely that much of this new power will
be used to manage and catalog knowledge and
information on increasingly sophisticated com-
puter networks. (These advances might even
reduce the flow of paper across my desk!).
Inexpensive and powerful computers already
are permitting the design and implementation of
knowledge- and document-management systems
at individual-department levels, a luxury that
would have been difficult to afford only a few
years ago. More powerful computers also will
continue to improve communications, permitting
faster and more precise transmission of large
amounts of information over long distances. The
lower cost of high-speed international data links
already is permitting major multi-national cor-
porations to better share information around the
world in real time, and perhaps has contributed
to some of the mega-mergers of recent years. At
the same time, the lower price of ICT equipment
likely has lowered the costs of starting and oper-
ating a small business. Accounting software can
replace an accountant; a word processing program
can replace a typist; web pages can replace a
printed catalog; and e-mail can replace a telephone
receptionist.
These developments are obviously extremely
important. They will permanently increase the
level of labor productivity. But given our current
understanding of these issues, they are unlikely
to yield a permanently higher growth rate of pro-
ductivity.Itseemsprobabletomethateventually—
although I have no idea when—the technical
advances that have been creating the sharp
declines in the price of computing power will
slow, perhaps as a consequence of fundamental
laws of physics that control how many transistors
can be packed onto microchips. When the price
decline of computing power slows, the applica-
tion of additional computing power per unit of
labor will slow, and so also will the rate of growth
of labor productivity. But let me emphasize again
that I have no idea when the growth will slow or





I’ll conclude my remarks by attempting to
place the events of the past decade in the context
of international economic history. Although data
are incomplete, it seems unlikely that in the past
any technology has experienced price decreases
of the scale we have recently experienced for ICT
equipment and software. Electricity spread fairly
rapidly into both homes and factories during the
two decades after Edison and Westinghouse
agreed on industry standards during the late
1890s. But, following the introduction of these
standards, the cost of electrical equipment and
appliances didn’t decrease sharply relative to
other goods or wage rates, during the first quarter
of the twentieth century.
The world in the past has experienced sharp
fluctuations in productivity growth and likely will
again. The historical record suggests, however,
that sustaining more than a 2 percent annual
growth rate of labor productivity for an extended
period is unlikely. Economic historians tell us
that the world entered a new “capitalist” era in
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per worker had increased very little. Since then,
there has been a fairly steady increase in the
amount of physical capital per labor hour, and
worldwide output (GDP) per person employed
has increased more than eight fold. Historians
agree that Great Britain was the technological
leader up to about 1890; they also agree that labor
productivity grew at only about a 1.4 percent
annual rate during that period.
About 1890, the United States took the mantle
of “technological leader” away from Britain. At a
conference of educators, it seems appropriate to
note that historians give much of the credit to the
U.S. higher education system. The Morrill Act of
1862, which created land grant universities, stim-
ulated teaching and research in both agriculture
and engineering. In engineering, within a decade
after passage of the Morrill Act, the number of
engineering schools went from 6 to 70, and then
to 126 by 1917. U.S. engineering schools graduated
100 students in 1870; by 1917, the number was
4,300. As early as 1890, the ratio of university
students per 1,000 primary school students in
the United States was two to three times that of
any other country. In agriculture, as late as 1914,
the United States was well behind Europe in
scientific agriculture—a generation later, the
United States was the world leader.
Since 1890, U.S. productivity growth has not
been smooth. Productivity grew most rapidly
during 1950 to 1973, when much of the world was
catching up, technologically, to the United States.
Some of the U.S. growth during this period may
have reflected a recovery process after the disrup-
tions of the Great Depression and World War II.
The second best period was 1870 to 1913 with
about 2 percent annual growth, as the United
States was pulling ahead, technologically, of
Great Britain. Perhaps surprisingly, the slow 1
percent productivity growth during 1973 to 1992
still ranks that era in third place.
In the best of all worlds, we can only hope
that the recent 3 percent annual growth in labor
productivity continues. For the United States,
the long-run trend of labor productivity growth
seems to be approximately 2 percent. Before the
Golden Age of 1950 to 1973, productivity grew
at about a 2¼ percent annual rate between 1890
and 1929 and about a of 1 percent rate between
1929 and 1938. Even a 2 percent trend would be
superior to the economy’s performance during
the 1970s and 1980s.
An important bottom line for me as a policy-
maker is that the state of the economic science of
productivity growth contains many huge gaps.
The state of knowledge does not justify firm con-
victions about any productivity growth forecast,
although a range of 3 to 4 percent over the next
few years does seem sensible to me.
Given our incomplete knowledge, it is impor-
tant that we not lock ourselves into a monetary
policy that depends on any particular rate of
productivity growth. It is certainly quite possible
that today’s productivity growth will be main-
tained for the next decade, or rise further. By the
same token, it is obviously dangerous to simply
assume that our good times will roll on for the
foreseeable future. It is not very satisfying for a
former academic to say that we’re going to have
to watch carefully, and that such watching is
about the best advice we can take. But that does
seem to me to be our situation, like it or not.
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